Tuesday, November 07, 2006

Future American Citizenship

Social Citizenship as a concept is almost totally absent in America today. Many Western democracies have accepted the premise that public welfare is a central component to citizenship, but something about American political realities have prevented a similar understanding. However, there may be a way to incorporate the important concepts of social citizenship in such a way that will not offend American sensibilities.

Section 1.
First off, Desmond S. King & Jeremy Waldron endorse nationwide welfare as a component of citizenship for a multitude of reasons in their article “Citizenship, Social Citizenship and Welfare Provision”. They define social citizenship as “more than a simple safety-net; it refers to the universal provision of education, health, social security and welfare benefits (financed through a system of redistributive taxation) available as attributes of citizenship” (418) available to everybody. Social citizenship’s significance is reducing economic influence and social status while enhancing other aspects of citizenship: “securing basic social standards does in fact promote the existence and exercise of other citizen rights” (420) by giving citizens an informed voice, indirectly providing them with time to participate, promoting community identity and a sense of belonging, and fulfilling already established social contracts as in the U.K.
By “providing minimum standards in these areas the state offsets the vagaries of market processes and corrects the gross inequalities of distribution arising from the market” (419) and reduces the punishment of economic failure, something the American public is less than enthusiastic about. This economic inequality has understandably undesirable political entanglements, because ideally “no one must be rich enough to be able to purchase the dependence of another, and none poor enough to be bought in that way…. a citizen should be the one who is in a position to bring his or her own judgment to public issues” (427) and be independent. Economic inequality is also destabilizing in a society, especially in a democracy, because “hungry people must not be let loose in the political forum, for their needs will impel them to make demands that subvert and short-circuit the leisurely course of citizens’ deliberations” (429) and upset the balance of the entire political structure.
Originally, citizens under the Hellenistic republican model “could not act as citizens at all, or could not expect to act well in the political sphere and to make adequate decisions, unless some attention was paid to matters of their wealth, their well-being and their social and economic status” (426). The original Greek citizens had all the petty details taken care for them by their numerous family members and servants, allowing them to dedicate their waking hours to being active participants in the governance of the city-states. This freedom of time was essential to the very concept of citizenship, indeed it was a prerequisite. Obviously, this ideal cannot be justifiably replicated in modern times, but the principal still holds. Citizenship requires a certain amount of freedom from immediate and demanding commitments; be they economic, familial, or otherwise… so that civic duties may be carried out without influence or distraction by trifle economic realities. To further emphasize the importance of equality, the authors quote Marshall who says that social services provide “a general enrichment of the concrete substance of civilized life, a general reduction of risk and insecurity, an equalization between the more and the less fortunate at all levels” (423) and elevate lifestyles across the board without implementing the restrictive social systems of the ancients.
Social services are catalyst for the other essential components of citizenship, maximizing the potential implementation of rights and duties. King and Waldron use education as an example, not only because it contributes “to a person’s own well-being, free education is a social good; in its contribution to her or his political status and capabilities, it is a political right and, indeed, a political duty” (420). Social services prepare and enable citizens to exercise their political rights with informed choices, speak and with minimal influence by others, and lead fully active and healthy lives in their communities.
King and Waldron, when speaking of Britain, argue that “welfare guarantees have been established in this society (for whatever reason) to the claim that they are now part of what we understand by citizenship” (432). Oddly, this is a conservative argument, that the status quo should not be changed abruptly because of tradition. This expectation of welfare provisions is now taken for granted, and “people are willing to take much greater risks when they know that there is a safety net” (434), and adjusted their behaviors accordingly. Because large amount of planning and expectations have hinged upon these public institutions, to drastically change them overnight would be a violation against British citizens and a breaking of a social contract with the government. Any drastic changes would have to be slowly phased in to minimize disruptions and make citizens feel that government is upholding its end of the bargain.

Section 2.
Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon examine the American political climate in their article “Contract versus Charity: Why Is There No Social Citizenship in the United States?”. In the contemporary United States “the word public is often pejorative” (114) and the conceptions of “welfare are so negative weak and degraded that ‘social citizenship’ here sounds almost oxymoronic” because of the association with people of low civic status.
The American emphasis on civil citizenship overshadows social citizenship entirely, as citizens “pride themselves on a commitment to civil liberties and civil rights” (114) and the attempts to make all citizens equal in the eyes of the law. In fact, “U.S. thinking about social provision has been shaped largely by images drawn from civil citizenship, especially images of contract” (114-115) with the reciprocal exchange and absence of entitlement that contractual agreements bring to mind. In a world of “discrete contractual exchanges of equivalents” (115), the conception of charity arose as freely giving goods or services with no-strings-attached, completely non-contractual. Fraser and Gordon maintain that conception of social citizenship is obscured by the ideas that financial interactions between people are either in the form of contractual exchanges or in the form of charitable gift-giving, and this mindset and language has prevented the idea of welfare rights from taking hold.
The problem is the destruction of the idea of entitlement: “No descent welfare policy can emerge without a vision of honorable entitlement for those who require help” (115). The United States does not recognize this concept, in large part because of its historical lack of aristocracy, considerable work ethic, and the enshrinement of only civic and political rights in the founding documents like the Constitution, especially in regards to property rights. The closest conception to entitlement in the American psyche is the former slave system in the south, where slaves were entitled by their masters to food and shelter. The only other analogue seems to be family life, where ‘dependents’ are entitled to a considerable amount until they are set loose upon the world. All other forms of material gain have fallen into the contract-or-charity dichotomy.
The conception of welfare in the presence of this dichotomy results in the conceptions that either people invest in a system and later get it back (ala Social Security) or “public assistance, where they have no such right, since they are thought to ‘get something for nothing’” (115). So, hostility exists towards the idea of social citizenship because of “the idea that welfare recipients are getting something for nothing while others must work, hence that they are violating standards of equal exchange” (117) and welfare becomes in essence forced charity, or as King & Waldron put it “compulsory charity” (417) The modern conception of charity is as “a pure, unilateral gift, on which the recipient had no clam and for which the donor had no obligation” (123); in fact the recipient was stigmatized for giving nothing back and the donor exalted for requiring nothing in return. Forced charity legitimizes inadequacy and takes away all of the esteem and credit of voluntarily sacrificing, hence the unwillingness to adopt the idea in American society.

Section 3.
Now for the tricky part: how to incorporate welfare provisions into the American citizen identity? The answer is easy: don’t… at least not in commonly understood manner. Social citizenship as currently understood will not be adopted by the American public anytime soon, due to the reasons above. There is too much of a perception of government ineptitude and inefficiency (not unjustified) for welfare to be entitled to all citizens. Not only that, but there is a proud culture and tradition of private charitable organizations in the United States that would be profoundly undermined if social citizenship were enacted, and these charities are far more flexible, reactive, and innovative than public programs can ever hope to be.
Mainly, the problem is taxes. Most Americans don’t like paying taxes, and recoil in horror at the proportionately higher rates that European countries are contributing. Americans see poor quality public services and see them as a waste of money, which leads to under-funding and becomes a self-reinforcing cycle. American emphasis on freedom includes freedom from excessive taxation, and the freedom to choose politicians who promise to lower said taxes. Any proposed solution will have to take this into account.
Then there is the problem of passivity that some argue social citizenship encourages. The argument of recipients being dependant spawning welfare queens is an old one, but in all likelihood many people would be satisfied with the minimum standard of living, becoming less likely to try and improve themselves. This perception, no matter its basis in reality, is too well ingrained for Americans to rapidly accept permanent, unlimited social citizenship entitlements. Passivity is also a risk on the other end of the scale, as paying taxes may be seen completing one’s civic duty and totally fulfilling social obligations. This passivity, the idea that everything else can be taken care of by somebody who is paid to do it, encourages bureaucratic specialization and diminishes all other aspects of citizenship.
So, what welfare provisions are attainable and compatible with American ideals as well as social citizenship? Refer to the old adage: think of the children. They are both future citizens as well as dependants, surely the most deserving of the ideals of social citizenship, indeed usually the targets. Programs demanding ever-increasing high minimum standards of education are hard to disagree with. Creating the civic duty of educating the next generation either publicly, privately, or whatever, would enhance all other aspects of citizenship by giving future citizens intelligent contributions to public policy, future means of supporting themselves, and a community based responsibility that spans the private lives of all procreating adults. This aspect of social citizenship is already well established in America, without stigma, and needs to become a prime focus involving the majority of citizens.
Next to implement would be the right to health, entitling the future adult citizen the healthiest intact body attainable. This would prevent a lifetime of difficulties later on, and is therefore economically justifiable as well as the smart thing to do. Vaccines and other public health requirements have already been institutionalized with minimal outcry, but need to be expanded to ensure the maximized survival, health, and development of the youth into adulthood and citizenship. Also in this component is the food and nutritional needs of the young, slightly dangerous due to fears of overpopulation, but absolutely essential to health. Making eating vegetables part of one’s civic duty seems somewhat ironic, but very practical.
This next welfare provision will easily be the most controversial: that of providing a large, one-time entitlement of tens of thousands of dollars to young adults upon attaining citizenship. Instead of guaranteeing a lifetime minimal standard of living, which Americans would oppose, providing the money upfront allows the new citizens to apply their education for anything they see fit. The one-time entitlement can be used to drive the consumer economy, saved and used slowly over a lifetime, invested in creative and hopefully profitable ways, used for further education, or given away by the wealthy or pious. This is the perfect union of American ingenuity and the idea of social citizenship: maximizing the choice and freedom of the individual while equalizing the distribution of wealth without creating lifetime dependants.
Now that all the needs of the upcoming citizens have been taken care of, what of the worse off of the adult citizens? The American intolerance towards entitlement already established, some public help along these lines should be maintained and expanded. Minimum wages should be connected to inflation and otherwise left alone. Free vaccines and other preventive health measures should be provided to minimize costs further on. The right to cheap public transportation should be written into law so people can explore opportunities everywhere. Service in the military, in whatever form, should be open to everybody as a means of employment. And of course private assistance from family and charities should also be encouraged as a duty not enforced by law but by public sentiment.
Also, don’t forget the impact that having the educational, nutritional, and health care needs of the young provided for takes a great deal of pressure off of the public. Adoption as a practice is certainly much less of a burden, as is the strain of losing ones job or spouse. In fact the whole focus of social citizenship lands squarely on where it belongs: preparing a temporary class of dependants for the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. This touches the lives of everyone while they’re young and anyone involved in raising a child. The number people contributing financially to the system will always be larger than the recipients (barring unprecedented population growth or disaster). And everyone will have a decent chance at success, which is the whole point of social citizenship.

Conclusion
Social citizenship is an important component missing in American politics. The need for education, healthcare, and financial assistance is paramount to the practice of the rights and duties of citizenship. The American obsession with contractual and charity-based economy transactions needs to be adjusted to reemphasize the entitlements of children by adults, perhaps along the lines of nation-wide greater familial responsibilities. Social citizenship can best be adopted by the American public when it focuses on the one universally accepted dependant population of minors, and gives them the best tools available to become healthy, informed, and entrepreneurial adults committed to raising the next generation.

Works Cited




King, Desmond S. Waldron, Jeremy. “Citizenship, Social Citizenship and the
Defence of Welfare Provision” British Journal of Political Science, Vol.18, No.4


Fraser, Nancy. Gordon, Linda. “Contract versus Charity: Why Is There
No Social Citizenship in the United States?” The Citizenship Debate: a reader